Market dominance and hubris (Part Three)

Nokia failed completely by totally losing its entire smartphone leadership and eventually sold it, leading to the end of the brand as a market leader. Nokia was founded in 1865 by mining engineer Fredrik Idestam, and operated as a paper mill in Finland. Eventually, Nokia’s paper mill, merged with rubber and cable companies in 1967, and only pivoted heavily to electronics and mobile phones business in the late 1970s to early 1980s, establishing Mobira Oy in 1979 and launching its first car phone, the Mobira Senator, in 1982. It then introduced their first handheld phone, the Mobira Cityman 900, in 1987, and shifted focus to telecoms in the early 1990s. 

It’s when Jorma Ollila, CEO from 1992 to 2006, is said to have stayed "too long" (14 years) at the helm of the Finnish company. He led Nokia to become the world’s largest handset manufacturer, but the company struggled to transition to smartphones, lagging behind in software (Symbian) and failing to respond to the iPhone's launch. He was replaced by Stephen Elop as CEO (2010–2014) who would be heavily criticized for the "burning platform" strategy, leading to the sale of Nokia’s phone business to Microsoft. 

 

On the other hand, Jean Beyl the inventor of the early Look bindings, also remained in charge for too long and soon became a problem because the skill sets required to create his inventions (creativity, passion, deep technical knowledge) went against the skills required to scale a business (delegation, operational discipline, sound marketing, financial management). 

While Beyl was a visionary in his own right, he always struggled to transition from "doing" into "leading," micromanaging and creating bottlenecks in decision-making and erecting a "founder's syndrome" where the organization became constrained by his management style, ego, German girlfriends and refusal to delegate. Still Look did survive. 

Having come too late with its “9 series” to enjoy a positive impact, the company went bankrupt, was picked up for one Franc* by Tapie, a French raider whose sole focus was to line-up his pockets, leading to another quick sale, another long hiatus, until Rossignol skis picked up the pieces, intelligently simplified the line and made it an accessory to its ski line instead of being a self-standing philosophical statement. 

So unlike Nokia, Look did not disappear but kept chugging along as it gradually transitioned. The iPhone was a "tsunami" that metamorphosed the industry in 2 to 3 years. While there are parallels between the origin of the two stories, the outcomes were drastically different as Nokia didn’t change hands until it was too late, while Look benefited from the hiatus created by two or three different owners. 

Also the nature of the ski business made it extremely unique with its inherent seasonality, its challenging short three-month annual cash-flow period, and its small number of participants (around 75 to 100 millions skiers in the late 2000s?) plus the gigantic difference in size of the respective industries (mobile phones being 1,000 times larger than alpine ski binding in sales volume) can’t be overstated even though both markets spanned the globe... 

 *As opposed to Salomon’s $1.4 billion acquisition by Adidas in 1997

Market dominance and hubris (Part Two)

When it comes to comparing how the iPhone took over of Nokia, to what Salomon did to Look in the ski industry, I can only speak from personal experience as a former Look employee, in thinking how Salomon rose to prominence over Look ski bindings in the 1970s, culminating in the late-70s launch of the S727 "Driver" series. 

This product evolution holds a strong parallel to the Nokia-Apple shift, as it highlights a technological pivot from an established, engineering-heavy design to a user-centric, more functional, and more accepted solution that redefined industry standards. Beginning in the 1960s, Look was a dominant, trusted, high-performance, and high-prestige ski binding manufacturer with its Nevada & Grand-Prix models.

Salomon, however, changed the game by shifting the intangible idea of ski-safety into user-focused design. The big difference was the hubris from Look’s inventor Jean Beyl who didn’t believe in funding a strong R&D and listening to his market, as opposed to the open mind and common sense exhibited by Georges Salomon who took their respective companies in dramatically different directions. 

Look bindings (like the Nevada) often required specific, sometimes difficult installation on skis and adjustments to ski boots, but most significantly was rather inconvenient to use on snow. Salomon began by simplifying its engineering, making it less costly to manufacture, designing bindings that were easier to install and adjust at the ski shop level, and ultimately much easier to use by the end-consumer. 

After years of struggling with its 404 and 505 then 555 series, Salomon gradually introduced several “game-changer”. First the 444 a mid-range ski binding, super easy to get in and out of, then its functional ski brake that made safety straps obsolete, followed by the release in the late 1970s of the Salomon S727 that was the final nail into Look’s coffin.

Unlike Look, which initially was slower to integrate the brake into the binding mostly because of its specific design, Salomon, also a leader in patents, was a leader in integrating a sleek brake technology that tied the skis together, which quickly became a standard replacement for run-away straps. Then at the back-shop level came the “pre-mount” system that had mounting screws already attached to the bindings and ready to screw into the holes, not to mention its much more convenient mounting templates. 

Salomon was able to place itself in the end-user shoes (shops and consumers) while Look simply would not. Tomorrow we’ll see the similarities and also the key differences between these two declines...

What are our values? (Part Three)

When values become behaviors, they become unforgettable, and with that in mind, it’s time to see how we can make our values unforgettable. To help, let’s select our values (5 maximum), write them on just one single card, with clear definitions and for each, one specific behavior. 

Keep it short, and remember that if it doesn’t fit on a card, it won’t fit inside our mind. Then we need to rehearse them weekly, not as a moral exercise, but as a calibration. For instance, ask: 

• “Where did I live these values this week?” 
• “Where did I betray them?” 
• “What did I learn?” 

Values become stable through repetition. At that point of mastery, it’s time to use them to make one real decision, as values become more real when they cost something. When you use a value to say no, choose a path, end or begin something, it becomes part of your identity. Better yet, teach them to someone else by explaining how our values force clarity, and also make them part of our narrative. 

At the end of the day, values are not remembered, they are practiced. We don’t “remember” our values the way we remember a phone number or an address, we live them until they become instinct and if we practice our values long enough, they become a reflex, they shape our intuition, guide our decisions without any conscious effort and this becomes part of our character. 

That’s the real goal. Finally, if you still are looking for one or two values in your list of five, ask yourself the following question: “What are the principles I refuse to compromise, even when no one is watching?” This should reveal them. Good luck!

What are our values? (Part Two)

Today, we’ll go over the “Three‑layer values framework” that we introduced in our preceding blog. This might be the most effective way to make our values stick and help us remember them at all times. Let’s begin with layer 1, our core values (3–5 words) that are the non‑negotiable ones or are those we would defend even at all cost. 

Let’s take the following five values as an example (they’re not yours but are just illustrations): 

• Integrity 
• Persistence 
• Mastery 
• Courage 
• Creativity 

The list is voluntarily limited, if we have too many they’ll lose their meaning. The next layer, number 2 is simply stating what each value means to you. This is where most of us fail. A value without a definition is just a slogan. For example: 

• Integrity → “I tell the truth even when it’s inconvenient.” 
• Persistence → “I will never give up, no matter the difficulties and the time it takes.” 
• Mastery → “I will always do a great job, that will make me proud and that will last.” 
• Courage → “As long as I don’t take excessive risks, I won’t be stopped by fear, menaces or influences.” 
• Creativity → “I love to improve things by innovating and finding a better way.” 

This translation step makes the value memorable because it becomes yours, not a dictionary word. Finally there is layer 3, a behavioral anchor, this is the secret ingredient, that for each value defines one concrete behavior that proves you’re living it. Examples: 

• Integrity → “I never lie and don’t say things I don’t believe.” 
• Persistence → “My failures were when I didn’t didn’t stick to my plan and won’t repeat them.” 
• Mastery → “Since my time is the only treasure I have, I must do things right the first time.” 
• Courage → “This trait consistently paid off for me, so why would I do without it?” 
• Creativity → “Therein lies my greatest skill, so I must put it to use whenever I can!” 

You now have the three series of layers. In our next blog, we’ll see how we can practice them and make them work for us...

What are our values? (Part One)

If most of us were asked off the cuff, what our values are, we might be hard pressed to answer, or if we could articulate a few of our values, it might not be that precise or we might forget important ones as we would be collecting ourselves, thinking and coming up with something that made some sense to the person we responded to.

So the question of the day is: “How can we identify and remember our values at all times?” The answer is that it’s indeed possible to precisely define and remember our values by turning them from vague ideas into lived, practiced, embodied principles, and by giving them enough structure so that our mind can recall them under pressure. 

Let’s see how we can do this. We need to start by building a structure that fits how we think, that is in systems, meaning “long arcs” and clarity. Clearly, there are values that feel slippery when asked “on the spot”. It’s also true that if most people can’t spontaneously tell what their values are, they know instinctively they’re there without having named them, organized them, or tested them by telling or writing them down. 

It’s true that values live as felt truths, hidden inside us and not readily available under the form of ready-made sentences. When someone asks, “What are your values?”, they’re asking us to translate some instincts into words, and that’s why it feels so awkward. The solution is to externalize them by using this reliable method that is called the “Three‑layer values framework”. 

Tomorrow we’ll discover what it’s all about, so please, don’t miss that episode!

My Short Career at Odo

Freshly graduated from the watchmaking school in Cluses in 1966, my first job in the trade took me to the Research and Develpment at Odo, in Morez, in the Jura region of France. 

At the time, this company manufactured electric clocks. Owned by the Odobez family that had lived in the area since the 17th century, it gradually came to watchmaking from farming and nail-making. 

Between 1660 and 1800, the Odobez family crafted mechanical parts during the winter months and in 1806, Jean-Baptiste Odobez, aka "Jean le Comtois"—emerged as a master local watchmaker. 

In 1843, François-Désiré Odobez, succeded him, perfecting the iron-cage movement used in the so-called “Comtoise” clocks; then, in 1885, the firm "Odobez Père et Fils" was established in Morez to manufacture timekeeping instruments. What became the Odo company was founded in 1920 by Léon Odobez’s sons, André and Roger, in partnership with the Moret-ès-Jean Barbaud family. Together, they industrialized production and modernized the enterprise. 

Odo’s golden age spanned the period from 1930 to 1970. In 1931, the famous Odo chime clock was launched—a timepiece that would find a place in countless French households. It was a tremendous commercial success. It was followed in 1937 by the "Gai Carillon" (Joyful Chime); Odo had commissioned Vincent Scotto—a highly popular composer of the era—to create a unique melody to distinguish their clock from the Westminster chime. It turned out to be a stroke of marketing genius. 

Incidentally, I inherited just such a clock from my parents—a timepiece I still have in Park City today. The 1950s saw the diversification of Odo’s product line, introducing electric clocks, battery-operated alarm clocks, wall-mounted chimes, and modernized “Comtoise” clocks. The company expanded, setting up its main factory on Rue Voltaire in Morez, and adding two sites in Montmorot and Domblans; by 1980, its workforce reached 300. 

This was about the time (1966) when I arrived as a young graduate from Cluses to join the R&D as a technician. Odo was then at the very peak of its industrial power. I enjoyed my work in the design office, which was headed by Mr. Péricouche, and I was taken under the wing of Jeantet, a fellow draftsman. Unfortunately, I did not take to liking this isolated corner of the Jura region and remained there for only a few months before setting out to pursue skiing a passion that was already consuming me. 

After my departure, things began to take a turn for the worse for Odo (I know, I should have stayed!). The causes of this decline were easy to track. First and foremost was the collapse of the domestic clock market. Indeed, starting in the 1970s and 80s, wall clocks, chimes, and “Comtoise” clocks began to vanish from households as demand plummeted. 

Cheap electronic products imported from Asia made France production costs too expensive. It was then that Odo attempted to diversify by venturing into the sunglasses business securing a licensing agreement with the Bugatti brand but it was too late to offset the clock market collapse. 

In 2001, the Odobez family sold the company; in 2005, Odo’s new owners ceased operations and most recently, in 2025, the historic buildings on Rue Voltaire were demolished. 

And so, a page was turned and a book closed on one of the greatest French watchmaking houses of the 20th century.

The Rivian EVs

Among the electric vehicles (EV) made in the US, are Tesla and Rivian, though the latter brand is much smaller than Tesla. Rivian was founded in 2009 by RJ Scaringe as Mainstream Motors. Quickly, Rivian pivoted from sports cars to adventure-focused EVs, debuting the R1T and R1S in 2018 that are becoming very popular in Park City. 

Following a massive 2021 IPO and Amazon partnership, the company navigated production challenges to deliver over 40,000 vehicles by 2025, partnering with Volkswagen in 2024 to fuel 2026 expansion and the development, its latest model. By April 2026, Rivian was initiating production of that lower-cost R2 platform, aiming to tap into a broader market. 

Rivian generally ranks higher in owner satisfaction, but Tesla provides more mature tech and a better-established service network.Rivian offers a more premium, rugged, and adventure-focused experience with superior build quality and interior luxury, while Tesla excels in software, efficiency, and charging infrastructure. 

Rivian vehicles (R1T, R1S, and Commercial Vans) are manufactured in the US since 2017. It’s clear that they are actively taking business from Tesla customers, particularly in Democrat voting markets like California, who hate Tesla’s Elon Musk. 

In 2025, Tesla produced approximately 1,654,667 vehicles, while Rivian produced 42,284 vehicles. Tesla's total production, primarily Model 3/Y, far exceeded Rivian's output, which was affected by production line upgrades and reduced demand for luxury EVs. Based on Q1 2026 data, Tesla continues to dominate the EV market with significantly higher unit sales compared to Rivian, with Rivian maintaining a niche luxury presence ahead of its R2 rollout. 

The numbers for Q1 2026 Deliveries are 358,023 Teslas and 10,365 for Rivian. The brand’s presence outside the United States is currently focused on Canada and Europe, with active expansion efforts centered on service infrastructure and plans for future vehicle launches. 

While the company is primarily operating in North America, it has established a foothold in Europe to support its commercial delivery vans and prepare for consumer vehicle sales. The initial focus in Europe has been servicing the Rivian Electric Delivery Vans (EDVs) for Amazon. 

Recently, Rivian built a charging station in Park City that took two years to complete. That long delay stems from complex infrastructure permitting, construction planning for specialized trailer spots, and grid capacity limitations. 

Such projects often face lengthy approvals, including site planning and environmental reviews at the The Market at Park City plaza, which was approved to offer 12 fast chargers, with very few users since the facility opened up a month ago. It’s now clear that the high cost of gasoline should revive EV sales in America.