Sharp eye and sure footing…

When I heard we had received eight inches of powder overnight, I figured this new day was offering me an unexpected gift. Since I couldn’t get out in the morning, I set my sights on the afternoon, convinced that higher elevation would still hold the fluffiest snow. 

From the lift, everything looked promising—soft, untouched, inviting. But the moment my skis touched the surface, the illusion vanished. What had looked like powder had turned into heavy plaster, the kind that grabs your skis and makes every turn feel like a negotiation. I left that area and tried another, only to find the same stubborn, uncooperative snow. 

Still, something in me switched from disappointment to curiosity. Instead of fighting the conditions, I treated them like a game. And little by little, I found ways to make it fun. The challenge itself became the reward. That’s when it struck me: all these years on snow have built a catalog of sensations that live in the soles of my feet—tiny variations in pressure, edge angle, and balance that I don’t consciously think about but rely on constantly. 

My eyes, too, have been trained by thousands of runs to read terrain instantly, to spot both opportunity and danger long before I reach them. In difficult conditions, those two systems—vision and foot‑feel—start talking to each other. My feet recognize echoes of past situations and quietly offer solutions. My eyes scan ahead and choose the line that gives those solutions the best chance to work. When they sync up, even terrible snow becomes a kind of game. 

The frustration dissolves, replaced by a sense of competence, presence, and flow. And that’s when I’m reminded, once again, that there’s really no such thing as a bad moment on skis. There are only different moments—each one adding another layer to the skill, memory, and joy that keep me coming back.

Meet the “Demo Team!”

As spring get closer we all have projects to start, either around our homes or on other properties we have some interest in. But with any remodeling or improvements, there is always a hefty amount of “demo” or demolition, that’s often necessary.

Still, no one does a better job than the “Bibi”- Donald pair for breaking things. They bring their heavy equipment and hit everything in sight without worrying about any damage. From Gaza to Tehran you see both destroying any infrastructure and telling us they’ll replace ruins and rubles with a wonderful resort... 

Sure, Bibi does that to avoid losing his political immunity and end up going to jail while Donald does it to distract us from Epstein, his sinking ratings and our affordability problems. Out of personal concern and for my own safery, I wonder what this destructive duo will demolish next?

Olympic introspection… (Part Five)

It’s often strange how highly important decisions are made. France secured the 2030 Winter Olympics because it offered the IOC a low‑risk, politically supported, geographically coherent, and legacy‑focused plan across the French Alps. In truth, after Sweden’s withdrawal, it became on November 29, 2023, the IOC’s sole (it then said “preferred”) candidate. 

With a blatant shortage of candidates, the so-called IOC’s “new system” emphasized stability, feasibility, and political guarantees rather than competitive bidding. The French delegation was led by President Emmanuel Macron, who personally expressed France’s full commitment to delivering the Games and the IOC said it placed enormous weight on government guarantees, especially for the Winter Games that require complex infrastructure and climate‑resilient planning. 

France met these conditions within the IOC’s timeline. What made the IOC accept a Games spread across the entire French Alps was a concern to use existing venues and established winter‑sport regions to fit its new strategy, in spite of its highly publicized “sustainability” focus versus huge transportation needs. The IOC also liked the appealing narrative that the French Alps combined historic Olympic sites with modern facilities, creating a blend of heritage and future‑oriented planning. 

This was seen as reducing risk and enhancing the Games’ narrative appeal. France also had to offer explicit financial commitments to the IOC.in order to address its concerns about cost overruns and political uncertainty. 

Unlike other recent bids that stretched across multiple countries or distant cities, the French Alps were seen as forming a continuous, well‑connected winter‑sports corridor (more than 160 miles as the crow flies). Finally, France’s recent success with the Paris 2024 Summer Olympics clinched the deal. Should I repeat that the IOC had no other option?

Edgar Grospiron was chosen to lead the 2030 Winter Olympics Organizing Committee through a formal vote of the General Assembly of the newly created committee. on February 18, 2025. I’ve seen him when he was a toddler, as his parents moved to work for Vuarnet Sports, at Avoriaz, in the early 70s. 

The General Assembly justified its choice based on Grospiron’s deep Olympic and sports‑movement experience, which included, among others, Olympic champion in mogul skiing at Albertville 1992, Leader of the Annecy 2018 Winter Olympics bid and longstanding involvement in French winter‑sports governance. These credentials were explicitly cited as reasons for his appointment. 

Grospiron, who will turn 57 in March, is remarkably extroverted and might have lacked the diplomatic skills and managerial experience need for the job. That happened to me too. Still, the position is highly visible and well remunerated (probably around $25,000 to $35,000 a month), something kept secret in the French tradition of keeping a tight lid on transparency. 

It’s worth noting that Giovanni Malagò who ran the Milan 26 took no salary. More recently, the committee has experienced significant internal tensions, including the resignation of the CEO, COO, communications director, and head of the remuneration committee. These events do not affect how he was selected but help explain why his leadership has been under scrutiny. 

Time will tell us how this complex project develops in the less than four years that are left prior to the games…

Olympic introspection… (Part Four)

Without worrying about transparency, Alberville 1992, Lillehammer 1994, Nagano 1998 and even Salt Lake City 2002, never provided a detailed final budget, or profit and loss statement, or even cost‑overrun figures.

However, it’s pretty obvious that the Games required major infrastructure investments, with extensive venue constructions, major regional transport upgrades and development across multiple venues. Each likes to infer that its Games broke even, but I wouldn’t bet on it.

Torino 2006 and Sochi 2014 are totally different stories though, with Torino ending with a financial outcome clearly negative, and the Games leaving a long‑term burden on the city and its region. The clearest source states that the 2006 Turin Games “left a legacy of large debts and unused infrastructure”, describing the event as a cautionary tale for future hosts. The Games did not break even, the city and region were left holding a significant debt, The financial legacy was negative, period. 

Sochi was clearly engineered by Putin and with his oligarch friends and his subjects’ money he treated himself to the most expensive Olympics in history, and the financial outcome is unusually well‑documented. The available sources paint a consistent picture of massive cost overruns, extremely high total spending, and a long‑term economic burden, with only limited offsetting benefits. Independent analyses show that the total cost reached $55 billion, up from an original bid estimate of $12 billion. 

This represents a 4.5 times cost overrun, one of the largest ever recorded for any Olympic Games. Of that, $16 billion were sports‑related costs (venues, operations) while the remaining $39 billion went to non‑sports infrastructure such as roads, rail, power, and hotels. It’s evidently breaking records for cost overrun at $51 billion!

The jury is still out on the Milano–Cortina 2026 Games that just happened, but budget, overruns, and likely financial outcome are already well‑documented. 

The initial operating budget began at $1.77 billion and officially was revised to $2 billion. But its initial infrastructure budget at $4.5 billion might end up at $4.75 billion. 

Broader estimates place the overall cost at $6 to $7 billion when combining operations, venues, and legacy projects. Some analyses include all related works (roads, transport, regional upgrades) and reach $9.15 billion total, of which only $1.9 billion is strictly “Games-related”. 

Let’s wait and see a little to see at which level the final cost settles in. Some reports suggest that thee Organizing Committee Milano Cortina 2026 is on track to show a surplus between $59 million to $95 million. 

This would largely be due to record-breaking domestic sponsorship revenue, which surpassed $825 million. We’ll see! Tomorrow, we’ll plunge into the ambitious and highly complicated next Olympics, Alps 2030!

Olympic introspection… (Part Three)

If we examine the most recent Winter Olympics from 1992 to this day, we also see different tales and from best to worst, we may be surprised, but won’t be shocked. Across the board, full transparency is not the order of the day and may reflect the IOC’s secretive culture. 

Among the well-behaved and more responsible Olympic winter sites there is a remarkable trio. It’s Vancouver 2010, PyeongChang (South Korea) 2018 and Beijing 2022 that, just like the cream, rise to the top in behavior and performance.

PyeongChang is arguably the best and one of the very few Games that ended with a confirmed financial surplus, backed by crystal-clear numbers. The picture becomes even more interesting when we look at operational budget, infrastructure spending, and economic results side by side. Operationally, it yielded a confirmed $55 million surplus based on revenue of $2.245 billion and expenditure of $2.190 billion. 

If we can believe the Chinese, Beijing 2022 follows with one of the clearest and most unusual financial profiles of any recent Winter Olympics. Another surplus posted by the organizing committee, while the overall cost of the Games was far higher than originally planned. The available sources give us solid numbers on both sides, with a $52 million surplus on $2.3 billion revenue. 

The IOC also stated it would contribute US $10.4 million of its share of the surplus to the Chinese Olympic Committee. Vancouver too, ended up with a clean, documented financial outcome and a very clear picture. The Games are widely regarded as well‑managed financially, though the story differs depending on whether we look at operational costs or infrastructure spending. 

While the operating budget broke even, the infrastructure budget—which included venues, roads, transit, and city improvements—was a separate matter. Two major figures stand out, $603 million for venue development, delivered on budget, but $554.3 million were spent by the City of Vancouver alone for capital infrastructure and Games‑related operations. 

But like most Olympics, the public sector absorbed the infrastructure costs, which are not counted in the break‑even result. Tomorrow we’ll take a look at the other Games, including a preview of Milan 2026.

Olympic introspection… (Part Two)

Today, we’ll explore how financially successful the Olympics (mostly summer) were. We’ll begin with the single Olympic Games that really made money, Los Angeles in 1984, a standout example. These were operated without public funds and still delivered a surplus of over $200 million. Unsurprisingly, they became the model for how to run a lean, privately financed Games. Obviously the example didn’t translate into further success. 

Other Games have occasionally broken even or come close, but 1984 remained the only universally acknowledged major profit-maker. Then there are the many losers. Most Games since the 1960s have run massive deficits. Here are a few notorious examples, starting with Montreal 1976 that was so over budget that it took the city 30 years to pay off the debt. 

That should have been a cautionary tale for future hosts, but Athens also fell in the trap with billions in overruns and many venues abandoned afterward. In the case of Greece these costs overrun were the brick that broke the camel’s back in exacerbating that country’s later financial strain. In Brazil, Rio 2016 also had some severe cost overruns with many venues falling into disuse within months after the Games and long-term economic benefits failed to materialize. 

Even the careful Japanese and Tokyo 2020 (held in 2021) saw the Games’ costs ballooning due to COVID-19 delays, not to mention the fact that the expected tourism benefits evaporated as spectators were banned. As far as Paris 2024 was concerned the outcomes are still being evaluated, but early analysis shows that hosting the Games was “anything but cheap,” with costs around $8.7 billion. This rather negative outcome explains why fewer and fewer cities want to bid for the Olympics. 

The massive cost overruns are the main reason as Olympics routinely exceed their budgets by huge margins. As a result, cities know they’re taking on a huge financial risk with little chance of profit. Then there are the long-term debt and infrastructure maintenance costs. After the Games end, cities must maintain stadiums, arenas, transportation expansions, athlete villages and special infrastructures like bobsleigh runs that often become “white elephants.” 

There’s also growing public resistance as residents increasingly vote against hosting in referendums because they don’t want higher taxes, displacement, construction disruption and long-term debt. The Colorado population stands as an example for vehemently rejecting the 1976 Winter Games in Denver. 

Finally the IOC has gained a really bad reputation with its high demands for expensive new venues, costly adherence to new specifications, strict branding rules, heavy security, thin financial contribution and its nasty habit of grabbing most of the revenue generated. Next, we’ll focus on some of the most successful Winter Olympic venues in recent history and how each one performed in its own ways…

Olympic introspection… (Part One)

Now that the Winter Olympics are behind us, time for some introspection. As I said many times in this blog, the Olympic Games have morphed into a big business that’s not necessarily making money for everyone. 

As we all suspect, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and major corporate sponsors profit most from the Games, with the IOC generating billions from broadcasting (61%) and marketing (30%). Conversely, host cities and national taxpayers bear the majority of the financial burden, often covering massive, frequently over-budget construction, security, and operational costs. 

Talk about an expensive form of entertainment even if you don’t care to watch it, you’ll be guaranteed to pay for it! Yet, the whole enterprise is pushed – as usual - by our dear politicians. Cities or now, regions still bid despite these huge financial risks for a few simple reasons. It represents a super easy political job as it brings prestige and is seen as a global status symbol. In addition, local developers push hard because they profit regardless of the outcome. 

It’s easy to formulate optimistic economic projections and affordable costs, long before the event and bid committees never hesitate to use inflated forecasts in selling the idea to the public. Consider this, every Olympics since 1960 has gone over budget (except for Los Angeles in 1984), often massively with an average cost overrun at 172%. Montreal took 30 years to pay off its Olympic debt while Rio and Athens were left with abandoned venues and long‑term economic strain.

Did I mention that the jumps in Prelegato for Torino 2006 have become white elephants while Milan rebuilt new jumps in Val di Fieme even further away. Finally, there’s the “legacy” narrative as cities and host venues are promised long‑term benefits that rarely materialize. In the next episode we’ll dig deeper into the Olympics’ financial roller-coaster...